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How to Restore Animal Spirits and Reduce Unemployment: A Tax Credit for 
Employment Growth in Fiscal 2010 and 2011 
Abstract 
Returning to the 64.3% employment/population ratio of 1999-2000 would necessitate an 11+ percent 
increase in private sector employment in just two years (or a 13% increase in three years). A challenge for 
sure, but not impossible. Four times in the last 70 years, private sector employment has grown by more 
than 11 percent in just 24 months. Three of them were war related: entry into World War 2, demobilization 
after WW2 and entry into the Korean War. The peace time example was from January 1977 to January 
1979 when private employment rose 11.5 percent. This two year period also set a 50 year record for 
percentage increase in total hours worked in the non-farm economy and for increases in the employment-
population ratio. 
What caused such remarkable growth in 1977 and 1978? Answer: a generous TEMPORARY Federal tax 
credit for increases in employment above 102 percent of the firm’s 1976 level of employment. 
The Democratic Congress elected in 1976 arrived in Washington at a time of high unemployment, anemic 
(3.4% during 1976) employment growth and rising inflation due to the quadrupling of world oil prices in 
1973-74. It responded with a temporary New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) for 1977 and 1978 that lowered the 
marginal cost of expanding a firm's workforce by roughly 15 percent on average (more for low wage and 
high turnover firms). Despite foot dragging by the IRS, one third of the nation’s private employers received 
NJTC credits that lowered their 1978 taxes by $3.1 billion. By the final quarter of 1978, capacity utilization 
had spiked, real output had increased 15 percent and unemployment had dropped from 7.8 to 5.9 percent. 
The expiration of the NJTC at the end of 1978 did not unravel these effects. During the next 12 months, 
output and employment continued to grow albeit at a slower pace and the employment-population ratio 
and unemployment rate were stable. 
The later 1980 and 1982-83 recessions were caused by the 160% increase in oil prices precipitated by the 
Iranian revolution & the Iran/Iraq war and the Federal Reserve response to inflationary consequences of 
the oil shock. 
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How to Restore Animal Spirits and Reduce Unemployment: 
A Tax Credit for Employment Growth in Fiscal 2010 and 2011 
John H. Bishop, NYSSILR, Cornell University 
jhb5@ cornell.edu, 607-257-1402 or 607-227-0329 
Non-farm payroll employment has fallen 5.25 million in just 12 months. Six million additional 
workers are unemployed and an extra 3.4 million have been forced to take part-time work because full-
time work is not available. Freight rail car loadings are 20 percent below year ago levels. ATA’s Truck 
Tonnage Index has fallen 15 percent since the recession started. Retail sales are down 9 percent 
(www.census.gov/retail). The recession has been much deeper than the administration was expecting 
Figure 1 
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when the stimulus was being devised in early January (see figure 1). They have since lowered their 
forecast (NY Times 5/11/09). Independent forecasters have also become more pessimistic. The median 
forecast by the 61 economists surveyed by Bloomberg (5/12/09) predicted that unemployment will 
average 9.6 percent during 2010 and 8.5 percent in 2011. The Wall Street Journal June 5-9 survey of 
forecasters predicts unemployment will be 9.8 percent in June 2010 (Izzo, WSJ, 6/11/09). These 
forecasts incorporate the expected effects of the 3.5 million jobs created or saved by the $787 billion 
stimulus plan already passed. Brad Delong (June 17, 2009) now sees only a 30% chance of a rapid V 
shaped recovery. He concludes with “I do not understand why the Obama administration is 
following policies that presume such a rapid recovery --a V rather than an L for the shape of the 
recession--is not just possible but probable.” He recommends doubling the fiscal stimulus. 
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Clearly a second round of stimulus is needed. It should be temporary, simple to administer and 
leverage private resources to create millions of jobs at minimal federal expense. President Obama 
proposed a jobs credit during the campaign. Congress now needs to deliver on that promise. 
The Democratic Congress elected in 1976 faced a similar situation--high (7.5 to 7.9 %) 
unemployment and anemic (3.4% during 1976) employment growth. It responded with a temporary New 
Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) for 1977 and 1978 that lowered the marginal cost of expanding your workforce 
by roughly 15 percent on average (more for low wage and high turnover firms). Despite foot dragging by 
the IRS, one third of the nation’s private employers received NJTC credits that lowered their 1978 taxes 
by $3.1 billion. By the final quarter of 1978, real output of non-farm business had grown 15 percent in 
two years and unemployment had dropped from 7.8 to 5.9 percent. Private employment rose 11.5 percent 
from January 1977 to January 1979. In the 70 years the BLS has collected monthly data on private 
employment, this growth rate over a 24 month period was exceeded only three times--entry into World 
War 2, demobilization after WW2 and entry into the Korean War. The two-year percentage increase in 
total hours worked in the non-farm economy also set a record for the past 50 years as did the increase in 
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The 1977-78 NJTC had particularly positive effects on small companies, startups and private 
sector share of total employment. Industries eligible for subsidy grew more rapidly during 1977 and 1978 
than uncovered industries (eg. government and private colleges) Growth in 1977-78 was particularly 
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rapid in industries with many small firms: 18 percent in construction, 10.9 percent in retail trade, 10.8 
percent in professional and business services and 11.2 percent in physicians offices. Industries dominated 
by large firms grew more slowly—eg. by 6.6 percent for utilities and 8 percent for manufacturing. 
(Bishop 2008) 
A tax credit for increasing jobs in the U.S. encourages firms to use existing plant and equipment 
more intensively (eg. by staying open longer, increasing overtime or hiring additional workers). 
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And indeed capacity utilization did increase from 81.5 percent in December 1976 to 86.6 percent in 
December 1978 while the NJTC was in effect. That 86.6 percent rate of capacity utilization in 
manufacturing, mining and energy utilities has not been exceeded since. The jobs boom of 1988 and the 
late 1990s raised capacity utilization to 85 percent, but the average over the last 30 years has been 81.3 
percent. In May 2009 the FRB capacity utilization index set a record low of 68.3 percent—substantially 
below the previous record low of 70.9 percent in December 1982. 
What happens when a marginal employment tax credit expires? Do employers immediately 
reduce their work force? Apparently not. During the subsequent 12 months, output and payroll 
employment continued to grow albeit at a slower pace and the employment-population ratio and 
unemployment rate were stable. Manufacturing employment peaked in June 1979. 1 Industrial 
production was stable. Capacity utilization slowly declined as new capacity was brought on line. 
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Apparently, the temporary character of the employment subsidy induced some employers to expand now 
rather than later. When the subsidy ended, the new hires were retained and those who quit were replaced. 
Then two huge negative shocks hit the nation— the Iranian Revolution and the Iran/Iraq war caused oil 
import prices to increase by 160% and the Federal Reserve responded with a tough anti-inflationary 
monetary policy. These shocks caused the recessions in 1980 and 1982-83 (Hamilton 2003, 2009). 
There were a number of important features of the 1977-78 NJTC that contributed to its success 
and need to be retained in a modern jobs credit. The 1977-78 NJTC was: 
(a) Temporary (scheduled to disappear by January 1979). Firms had to act quickly. Labor was 
on sale and employers responded by undertaking expansions now rather than later. 
(b) Easy to describe, 
(c) Cheap to administer and audit, 
(d) Directly related to measures of employment routinely reported to the IRS, 
(e) Generous [a substantial share of the cost of hiring additional low-wage high-turnover 
workers], 
(f) Limited to firms expanding their work force by at least 2 percent over the previous year 
(g) Could not be gamed by changing business ownership. (Firms buying ongoing businesses 
assumed the 1976 employment threshold of the acquired business. Startups got half the rate 
of subsidy of firms with a track record of employment prior to 1977.) 
The research on the 1977-78 NJTC concluded that it was a remarkably cheap (only 0.13 percent of GDP 
and 0.3 percent of private sector wages and salaries) and effective way of boosting jobs (Perloff and 
Wachter 1979; Bishop 1981, Bishop and Haveman 1979, Bishop 2008). The job bang per deficit buck 
ended up being quite high. 
A Fiscal 2010-2011 New Jobs Tax Credit Proposal 
Each month without a job depletes family savings, adds to credit card balances and increases the 
likelihood of foreclosure, bankruptcy and uninsured medical emergencies. It is therefore urgent to get a 
FY2010-2011 NJTC into operation during the fall of 2009 and persuade firms to add jobs during FY 2009 
and 2011. The proposed NJTC would define the first six months of 2010 as the baseline employment 
level that firms must exceed in the fall of 2009, all of 2010 and 2011 to become eligible for the new Jobs 
Tax Credit. The quarterly data for making these calculations would come from the Employer’s Quarterly 
Tax Return (Form 941) that employers file along with their quarterly social security withholding tax 
payments. Most small employers hire accountants and payroll processing services like ADP to do this 
work. The filing and payments to the IRS are handled electronically and are easily checked for accuracy 
and consistency by IRS computers. 
The most comprehensive measure of employment and labor input available on Form 941 is line 2, 
total wages, tips and compensation paid during the quarter. It is a sum of compensation (including 
contributions paid for health insurance and pensions) paid all workers over the three-month period. Lets 
examine a hypothetical FY2010/2011 NJTC that starts in the third quarter of 2009 and expires at the end 
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of calendar 2011. The baseline threshold to which later compensation aggregates would be compared is a 
simple average of compensation in the first and second quarters of 2009 {BASELINE = (COMP
 2009Q1 
+COMP2009Q2 )/2}. For the fourth quarter of 2009, a NJTC with a rate of subsidy of X% would then 
equal:: 
1) NJTC2009Q4 = X%*[COMP2009Q4 – BASELINE] 
Since rising wage levels automatically boost aggregate quarterly compensation without actually changing 
real labor input, the threshold for subsidy eligibility (BASELINE) should rise each year. In 1977 Congress 
set a two percent per annum growth rate for employment threshold used in the 1977-78 NJTC. Since 
rising wage rates inflates total compensation I suggest raising that to three percent per year. A second 
decision Congress would need to make is whether to front-load the jobs stimulus by setting a higher X% 
in the first year than in the final year. For the year 2010 and 2011: 
2) NJTC2010Qi = X%*[COMP2010Qi – (1.03)* BASELINE] i indexes quarter 1, 2, 3, 4 
3) NJTC2011Qi = Ph*X%*[COMP2011Qi – (1.06)* BASELINE] i indexes quarter 1, 2, 3, 4 
Where Ph is the ratio of the final year and 2010 subsidy rates. 
If Congress wants to focus more of the NJTC subsidy on firms employing low wage and part time 
workers, it can do so by basing NJTC eligibility in part on increases in the number of employees on the 
firms payroll (reported on line 1 of Form 941). . All the formulas would be the same with the number of 
employees on the 12th day of the third month substituted for COMP. A number like $250 or $500 per 
quarter would replace X%. There is no guarantee, however, that each individual in a firm’s head count 
does a significant amount of work during the quarter. Firms might be induced to turn full-time jobs into 
lots of part time jobs or reclassify independent contractors as temporary employees. If head counts were 
the sole basis for determining a NJTC, employers offering well paid fulltime jobs would be at a 
competitive disadvantage. The average annual compensation of full-time private sector employees is 
roughly $60,000.2 Even a $1000 or $2000 tax credit for hiring employees paid $60,000 or more does not 
lower labor costs by enough to induce the firm to expand. I therefore recommend that a modern NJTC be 
based primarily on compensation (combining head counts with total compensation would also work). 
The tax credit percentage (X%) should be somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 or 15 percent of the 
additional compensation paid out. At a subsidy rate of 10%, hiring one additional $60,000 per year 
worker in October 2009 and retaining her for 27 months will generate $13,500 of NJTC tax credits over 
the first 27 months of the workers tenure. Delaying the hiring by one year, lowers the NJTC tax credits 
generated to $7500. In either case the firm receives significant benefits. We can be confident that 
employers will respond to such a NJTC by growing their domestic employment levels as they did 30 
years ago. Table 1 presents a simulation of the employment, GDP and federal revenues impacts of the 
NJTC described above. 
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Source and Notes for Table 1 . The simulation results are for a marginal employment tax credit for 
October 2009 through December 2011 that is based on increases in the firm’s total compensation above a 
threshold calculated from aggregate compensation paid in the first half of 2009. The first panel presents 
results for a tax credit with a threshold growing 3% per annum after 2009 and a subsidy rate of 10% of 
the difference between quarterly compensation (line 2 Form 491)and the firm’s threshold. The second 
panel presents results for a credit whose threshold grows at 4% per annum and a subsidy rate of 15% of 
the difference between quarterly compensation (line 2 Form 491)and the threshold. Rates of growth and 
decline vary a good deal across firms and cost effectiveness falls as dispersion increases. I assume that 
the standard deviation of compensation growth will be .10 for growth through December 2009 
(Comp2009Q4/Comp2009Q1&2). The assumed standard deviation is.14 for growth through 2010 and 
.16 for growth through 2011. Since the thresholds fall slightly below the expected mean growth of total 
compensation, 55% of private employment is in the zone of subsidy and assumed to potentially respond 
to it. The short run wage elasticity of labor demand was assumed to be -.15 based on Hammermesh’s 
(1993) literature review. That means that a 10% of compensation jobs tax credit will induce firms in the 
zone of subsidy to increase private employment by 1.5 percent on average. A NJTC would also increase 
the number of new firms established but the workers they hire are not part of this simulation. Since 
predictions of impacts and costs are sensitive to assumptions that are difficult to check, readers are 
encouraged to modify the assumptions and calculate how the results change. (An Excel spreadsheet with 
my imbedded formulas is attached.) 
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A 10 percent marginal Jobs Credit is predicted to reduce tax revenue by $36.8 billion (0.256 % of 
GDP) in 2010 and to increase labor compensation by a lot more ($62.2 billion dollars). The first round 
bang per buck is 2.2 in the final quarter of 2009, 1.69 in 2010 and 1.44 in 2011. The added workers will 
spend up to half of their compensation on domestically produced goods and services and this creates still 
more jobs and so on. When these second round effects are included, the Keynsian GDP gain to tax 
expenditure multiplier ends up being around 3.0—considerably larger than the CEA’s estimate of the 
infrastructure multiplier. If the spending multiplier is 2.0 and there is no crowding out in capital markets, 
the jobs credit boosts GDP by roughly 0.87 percent in 2010 and 20011. Increasing the generosity of the 
NJTC raises impacts roughly in proportion to the size of the tax expenditure (see panel 2). Lowering the 
threshold to attract more employers to participate, however, reduces cost effectiveness. 
Probably the most important recommendation for maximizing the impact of a jobs tax credit is to 
pass it quickly and mount an effective marketing campaign. Inform employers that adding workers will 
not increase the social security taxes they must send to the IRS. These costs will be largely offset by the 
NJTC. A simple online simulator allowing proprietors to calculate how much tax credit they will get 
under different employment growth scenarios would be a helpful teaching tool. 
These estimates of cost effectiveness would have to be reduced if the variation of growth rates 
across firms is greater than assumed and/or the wage elasticity of labor demand is lower than 
Hammermesh’s literature review concluded. On the other hand, these simulations are likely to be 
underestimating impacts because they do not model jobs tax credits effects on (a) employment after the 
tax credit’s expiration, (b) its effects on the formation of new firms and (c) its stimulus to more aggressive 
entrepreneurship. This results in the simulations understating the benefits of the jobs tax credit. 
There is a crying need for a cost effective way of rekindling the animal spirits of the nation’s six 
million employers and fourteen million self-employed entrepreneurs. The marginal employment tax 
credit just described responds to this need. It offers much stronger incentives for new firm formation and 
job creation than alternative proposals such as accelerated depreciation of labor saving equipment or cuts 
in top marginal tax rates. 
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Endnotes 
1
 Manufacturing employment reached an all time peak of 19,553,000 (seasonally adjusted) in June 1979. 
By the fourth quarter of 1982 capacity utilization in manufacturing had fallen to 68.6 percent, 15 percent 
of manufacturing jobs had been lost and unemployment had climbed to 10.6 percent. During the eight 
years of the Clinton presidency manufacturing jobs increased by 332,000. During the George Bush 
presidency manufacturing employment fell by 4,474,000 reaching 12,519,000 in January 2009. 
2
 In 2007, full-time full-year private industry workers received on average $57,600 in total compensation 
per year of which $48,035 was wages and salaries (NIPA industry data). Salary levels have climbed 
about 4 percent since 2007, so $60,000 is a good round number for 2009 compensation (including 
employer share of Social Security taxes)and $50,000 is a rough estimate for 2009 wages and salaries per 
full time private sector employee. 
